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BANNING THE PIT BULL: WHY BREED-SPECIFIC
LEGISLATION IS CONSTITUTIONAL
I.

INTRODUCTION

Pit bulls-a breed that accounts for only two percent of the
United States' dog population-have killed twenty people in four years,
most frequently children and the elderly.' Dr. Randall Lockwood, Director of Higher Education Programs for the Humane Society of the
United States, analogizes having a pit bull as a pet to "keeping a
loaded gun around." ' Reports of pit bull attacks have led to extensive
concern and debate, 8 and have prompted municipalities and state legislature to take steps to protect individuals from this potentially deadly
breed of dog. Some municipalities have chosen to completely ban the
pit bull from within city limits," despite claims by opponents that such
1. Cantu, Efforts to Ban Pit Bulls Spark Arguments over Residents' Safety and Civil Liberties, Wall St. J., July 6, 1987, at 13, col. 4.
2. Id.
3. See, e.g., Watson, A Mean Breed or a Defamed Pooch?, INSIGHT, July 27, 1987, at 54;
Sager, A Boy and His Dog in Hell. ROLLING STONE, July 2, 1987, at 36; Swift, The Pit Bull:
Friend and Killer, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, July 27, 1987, at 72; Brand, "Time Bomb on Legs."
TIME, July 27, 1987, at 60; Newman, No Justice for Victims of Pit Bull Dogs, Dayton Daily
News and Journal-Herald, Sept. 22, 1987, at 15, col. 1; Pit Bulls: Regulate Owners, Not Dogs,
Wall St. J., Aug. 17, 1987, at 14, col. 3; Pit Bulls-Best Friend or Time Bomb?, USA Today,
Aug. 10, 1987, at 1, col. 3; Pierce, It's Time to Put Bite in Dog Laws, Dayton Daily News and
Journal-Herald, July 29, 1987, at 19, col. 1; Group Defends Pit Bulls, Dayton Daily News and
Journal-Herald, July 20, 1987, at 1, col. 1; Pit Bull Owners Don't Like Being Singled Out, Dayton Daily News and Journal-Herald, July 12, 1987, at B3, col. 6; Owners, Foes in Dogfight Over
Pit Bulls, Cleveland Plain Dealer, May 10, 1987, at I-A, col. 1.
4. Some states and municipalities have strengthened their vicious dog legislation without
specifically prohibiting pit bulls. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 955.11(A)(4)(a) (Anderson
1987). The Ohio statute states:
"Vicious Dog" means a dog that, without provocation and subject to Division (A)(4)(b) of
this section, meets any of the following: (i) Has killed or caused serious injury to any
person; (ii) Has caused injury, other than killing or serious injury, to any person, or has
killed another dog; (iii) Belongs to a breed that is commonly known as a pit bull dog. The
ownership, keeping, or harboring of such a breed of dog shall be prima-facie evidence of
the ownership, keeping or harboring of a vicious dog.
See also R.I. GEN. LAWS § 4-13.1-1 (Supp. 1986) (defining "Vicious Dog" as "(4) Any dog owned
or harbored primarily or in part for the purpose of dog fighting or any dog trained for dog fighting"); DAYTON, OHIO, REV. CODE OF GEN. ORDINANCES §§ 91.01, .50, .99 (1987); CENTERVILLE,
OHIO, MUNICIPAL CODE § 505.01(a) (1984); FARMERS BRANCH, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES
§§ 6-65 to -80 (1987); EVERETT, WASH., MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 6.08 (1986); Midland, Pa., Ordi-

nance 540 (Sept. 8, 1987).
Other authorities have chosen to completely ban the pit bull from within city limits. See, e.g.,
CINCINNATI, OHIO, MUNICIPAL CODE § 701-24 (1987). The Cincinnati ordinance provides:
No person shall own, keep, or harbor a pit bull terrier, as defined herein, within the municipal limits of Cincinnati. "Pit Bull terrier" as used herein is hereby defined as any Stafford-
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action is unconstitutional.' This comment considers a number of constitutional challenges to a breed-specific ban, and argues that a ban on pit
bulls can survive such challenges.
II.

ANALYSIS

Statutes banning pit bulls have been challenged on three constitutional bases: Substantive due process, equal protection, and vagueness.
This analysis considers the grounds and the validity of each such
challenge.
A.

Substantive Due Process

The due-process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments to
the Constitution6 require that the statute in question "bear a rational
relation to a legitimate legislative goal or purpose,"' 7 unless the statute
implicates a "fundamental right" entitled to constitutional protection,
which would require a narrower fit between the goal and the statute.8

shire Bull Terrier or American Staffordshire Terrier breed of dog, or any mixed breed of
dog which contains as an element of its breeding the breed of Staffordshire Bull Terrier or
American Staffordshire Terrier as to be identifiable as partially of the breed of Staffordshire Bull Terrier or American Staffordshire Terrier.
See also Tijeras, N.M., Ordinance 32 (May 14, 1984) (discussed infra notes 119-24 and accompanying text), upheld, Garcia v. Village of Tijeras, No. CV 84-04162 (N.M. Dist. Ct., Bernalillo
County May 29, 1985), affid, No. 9424 (N.M. Ct. App. Oct. 11, 1988); Eufala, Okla., Ordinance
87-7-1 (July 6, 1987); Maumelle, Ark., Ordinance 37, § 19 (June 16, 1986). In addition, as of
October 15, 1987, 44 cities in Kansas have enacted partial bans and 34 cities have enacted complete bans on pit bulls. See League of Kansas Municipalities, Pit Bull Dog Ordinances in Kansas
Cities (Oct. 15, 1987) (on file with the University of Dayton Law Review). The constitutionality
of the Pittsburg, Kansas, and Shawnee, Kansas, complete bans were upheld by their respective
municipal courts. City of Pittsburg, Kan. v. Usher, No. 86-2599 (Pittsburg, Kan., Mun. Ct. -,
1987); see also Kansas Cities Take Action to Ban Pit Bulls, Hutchinson News, Mar. 2, 1986, at
5, col. 1.
5. See Comment, The New Breed of Municipal Dog Control Laws: Are They Constitutional?, 53 U. CIN. L. REV. 1067 (1984) (contending that breed-specific ordinances are unconstitutional). The University of Cincinnati Comment formed the basis for the legal opinion provided by
Dayton, Ohio, Director of Law J. Anthony Sawyer to the Dayton City Commission on May 28,
1987, that a ban on pit bulls would be unconstitutional. Memorandum from J. Anthony Sawyer,
Director of Law, Dayton, Ohio, to Richard B. Helwig, City Manager, Dayton, Ohio, May 28,
1987; see also City Commissioners Back Stiffer Vicious-Dog Law, Dayton Daily News and Journal-Herald, June 4, 1987, at 4, col. 1;Telephone Interview with J. Anthony Sawyer, Dayton,
Ohio, Director of Law, Aug. 10, 1987 (notes on file with the University of Dayton Law Review).
6. The fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
7. Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117 (1978), cited in Garcia v. Village of
Tijeras, No. 9424, slip op. at 5 (N.M. Ct. App. Oct. 11, 1988).
8. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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Since dog ownership is not a "fundamental right," courts have had no
trouble in determining that bans on pit bulls are rationally related to
the legitimate legislative goal of public safety. 9
1. The State's Police Power
It is clear that dog ownership is not a fundamental right.10 "No
proposition is more firmly entrenched in the law than that dogs are
subject to the police power of the state and that their regulation and
control is a proper and necessary function of the state."'" In the seminal case of Sentell v. New Orleans & Carrollton Railroad," the
United States Supreme Court, in considering a state's power to regulate dogs, declared:
Even if it were assumed that dogs are property in the fullest sense of the
word, they would still be subject to the police power of the state and

might be destroyed or otherwise dealt with as in the judgment of the
legislature is necessary for the protection of its citizens. 8

Indeed, the Court emphasized that a dog "holds its life at the will of
the legislature";"' even an absolute ban on ownership would be
5
permissible.1

Dogs are subject to an especially broad application of the police
power because of their nature. In Thiele v. City & County of Denver,"

the Colorado Supreme Court explained:
Through all the progress in its status, however, and though now accorded a full property status in our state, the original term of 'qualified
property rights' in dogs still has a valid standing. The term qualified is
9. Garcia, No. 9424, slip op. at 5-6.
10. Id. at 5 (by implication).
11. Shurtliff, Nature of Property in Dogs, 4 IDAHO L. REV. 105 (1967).
12. 166 U.S. 698 (1896) (upholding the constitutionality of a Louisiana law requiring dogs
to be placed upon the assessment rolls in order to be recognized as property).
13. Id. at 702.
14.

Id. at 704.

15. Id.; accord Garcia v. Village of Tijeras, No. 9424, slip op. at 12-13 (N.M. Ct. App.
Oct. 11, 1988).
In McGlone v. Womack, 129 Ky. 274, 275, 111 S.W. 688, 689 (1908), the Kentucky Supreme Court stated:
That dogs are an appropriate subject of regulation under the police power of the state is
established by an overwhelming weight of judicial authority; and unquestionably it is entirely within the power of the Legislature to prohibit the ownership of dogs at all, and to
provide, where their ownership is allowed, any regulation which the legislative discretion
may impose.
Id. at 275, 111 S.W. at 689; Shurtliff, supra note 11, at 109. See generally 7 E. MCQUILLIN,

§ 24.284, at 135 (3d ed. 1981).
16. 135 Colo. 442, 312 P.2d 786 (1957) (ordinance providing for impounding of dogs found
running at large did not deny dog owners due process of law even though the law did not provide
for prior notice to the owners).
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
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used because a dog as property is subject to a different application of the
state's police power than most other kinds of personal property. This is
due to the nature of dogs and the problems confronting society in how to
establish a modus vivendi therewith. All property is held by its owners
subject to the inherent police power of the state and cannot be used or
held in such a way as to injure others or their property.1"
The Colorado court agreed with the Sentell Court's evaluation that
dogs have no intrinsic value, 18 noting that dogs "are not considered as
being upon the same plane with horses, cattle, sheep, and other domesticated animals, but rather in the category of cats, monkeys, parrots,
singing birds, and similar animals, kept for pelasure [sic], curiosity, or
caprice. '"19

2.

The Nature of the Pit Bull: A Clear Threat to Public Safety

That the pit bull is a clear threat to public safety can best be
shown through an examination of the history, physical characteristics,
and traits of the breed. The term "pit bull" is a generic term for a
group of dogs whose ancestry can be traced to the bulldogs of the nineteenth century." Historically, these animals were used in the "sport" of
bull baiting. 1 After bull baiting was outlawed, owners of these fierce
and indefatigable dogs chose to make use of their dogs' die-hard tendencies in organized dogfights. 2 Owners began to genetically mix their
dogs to produce smaller, faster dogs such as the Bull and Terrier Dog,
Pit Dog, and Staffordshire Bull Terrier.2 When these dogs came to
America, they were known as Pit Dogs, Pit Bull Terriers, American
Bull Terriers, or Yankee Terriers.2 4 In 1898, the United Kennel Club
5
began registering American Pit Bull Terriers. The American Kennel
Club (AKC) did not recognize the American Pit Bull Terrier as a
breed until 1935,26 at which time, not wanting the dog's name to include the word "pit," it renamed the dog "Staffordshire Terrier," since
so many of the dogs came from that coal-mining, dogfighting region of
England. 7

17. Id. at -_,312 P.2d at 789.
18. Sentell, 166 U.S. at 701-02.
19. Thiele, 135 Colo. at -, 312 P.2d at 790.
20. R. LOCKWOOD & P. MILLER, "PIT BULL" REPORT 2 (Jan. 21, 1986) (on file with the
University of Dayton Law Review).
21. Id.
22. Id.; see also Kroll, The Savage Pit, 1 GEo, Nov. 1979, at 60 (discussing the continued
popularity of organized dogfighting in the United States).
23. R. LOCKWOOD & P. MILLER, supra note 20, at 2.
24. Id. at 3.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Swift, supra note 3, at 78.
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Despite the fact that dogfighting is outlawed in all fifty states,28

and classified as a felony in thirty-six,29 illegal dogfighting involving pit

bulls continues today.3 0 The very reasons dogfighters choose pit bulls
for this arena highlights the qualities of these dogs that make them

unfit to live in residential communities."1 First, the pit bull possesses
capabilities beyond those of other dogs. Biting with a force of 1800 to
2000 pounds per square inch, twice the force of the average Doberman
Pinscher or German Shepherd, 2 pit bulls possess jaws so specialized
that the jaws lock onto the object bitten. 3 At a 1986 Tufts University
School of Veterinary Medicine symposium entitled "Animal Aggression: Dog Bites and the Pit Bull Terrier,"3 " Sheryl Blair, Special Pro-

grams Administrator at the Center for Animals at Tufts University,
pointed out that pit bulls do pose a more serious problem than other
types of dogs, because "[t]he injuries these dogs inflict are more serious
than other breeds because they go for the deep musculature and don't
release; they hold and shake."3 6 Second, the pit bull has been selectively bred to fight without provocation and to continue to fight until it
is near death. 3 6 The dogs' genetically-based insensitivity to pain 7 also
helps to explain why it is often very difficult difficult to beat them off of

their victims.3 8 Most frightening, pit bulls do not give any warning sig-

28. E.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 959.16 (Anderson 1988); see also Kroll, supra note 22,
at 76.
29. E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 597 (West Supp. 1989); Kroll, supra note 22, at 76 (discussing dogfighting penalties and laxity in application of the laws); see also Brand, supra note 3, at
60.
30. Brand, supra note 3, at 60.
31. The Humane Society of the United States notes that "[o]ver a century of breeding for
bull-baiting and fighting [has] had a profound effect on the genetics of many of these breeds." R.
LOCKWOOD & P. MILLER, supra note 20, at 5. The Humane Society advises:
In view of the lack of uniform standards of temperament, the lack of inhibition of aggression, the strength and tenacity of attacks and the failure to show appropriate warning signs
of aggression, most animal control officers have come to regard these animals as potentially
dangerous unless proven otherwise. Even pit bulls with no prior history of aggression have
been known to become highly aggressive when at large, when in a pack, when confronted
by any aggressive dog or under other unpredictable situations.
Id. at 9.
32. Cantu, supra note 1, at 13, col. 4; see also Sager, supra note 3, at 36, 40; Brand, supra
note 3, at 60.
33. "Pit Bulls can bite with greater force than most dogs and once in a hold they do not
simply maintain the 'bite,' but continue to grind their premolars and molars into the tissue while
the canine teeth stabilize the hold." Clifford, Observations on Fighting Dogs, 183 J. AM. VETERINARY MED. A. 654-57 (Sept. 1983).
34. Swift, supra note 3, at 72, 75.
35. Id. at 75; R. LOCKWOOD & P. MILLER, supra note 20, at 8.
36. R. LOCKWOOD & P. MILLER, supra note 20, at 6.
37. Id. at 7.
38. For example, in the case against the owners of pit bulls that attacked and killed Dr.
William Eckman in Dayton, Ohio, on April 6, 1987, one witness testified that "his automobile was
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nals before an attack, and they do not stop attacking even when their
victim submits. In fact, pit bulls have been known to disembowel other
dogs that have rolled over to indicate defeat. 9

Defenders of the pit bull assert that the problem lies not with the
breed, but with irresponsible owners.40 Owners have been known to cruelly mistreat their animals so that they excel either as savage fighters,4 '
as vicious sentinels over illegal or illegally-obtained goods, 2 or as lethal
weapons in the perpetration of crimes." Nevertheless, owners alone

cannot be blamed for the vicious behaviors of this particular breed,
since cases have also been reported where the family pet pit bull has
suddenly turned on its owners." Hence, the regulation of the pit bull
cannot simply be left to the discretion of the individual because the
breed's behavior is too unpredictable.' No pit bull can ever be completely trusted to remain a docile family pet.' 6 As one judge put it,
American Pit Bull Terriers have been known to be friendly and docile at
one moment, willing to sit on your lap and lick your face, and at the next
moment to attack in a frenzied rage. . . .[S]uch berserk frenzies do not
occur in other breeds of dog. 7
There can be no question that a ban on the breed would bear a rational
relation to the legitimate legislative goal of public safety.'

rocked as Eckman clung to the bumper and the dogs pulled at him in the street." Deliberations
Begin in Pit Bull Case, Dayton Daily News and Journal-Herald, Oct. 15, 1987, at 3, col. 3. A
Baltimore police officer fired his gun at a pit bull that had bitten him, "[blut a colleague had to
club the dying dog on the head and then use a nightstick to pry its jaws loose." Pierce, supra note
3. Tina Harper, chief of animal disease control for the District of Columbia's Department of
Human Services noted, "They have very strong jaws, once they latch onto something, they don't
let go." Watson, supra note 3, at 54.
39. R. LOCKWOOD & P. MILLER, supra note 20, at 7-8.
40. See Pit Bull Owners Don't Like Being Singled Out, supra note 3, at B3, col. 6.
41. See Kroll, supra note 22, at 60.
42. "Some law-enforcement authorities say the pit bull has become the watchdog of choice
among drug dealers." Cantu, supra note 1, at 13, col. 4.
43. For example, a thief used a pit bull as his weapon in robbing a fast food restaurant; a
woman ordered her pit bull to attack two policemen. Id.
44. See infra note 88 and accompanying text.
45. See infra note 89 and accompanying text.
46. See Cantu, supra note 1, at 13, col. 4.
Investigating a dog's family history may be one way for would-be owners to avoid
problems. "Temperament is 70% hereditary," says Janice Price, an official at the American Kennel Club. "If you want to get a pit bull, make sure you meet the father and grandfather if you can." But she adds that even the best animals may have a checkered lineage.
"If you shake the family tree hard enough," she says, "you're going to have some biting
dogs."
Id. at 13, col. 6.
47. Garcia v. Village of Tijeras, No. 9424, slip op. at 7 (N.M. Ct. App. Oct. 11, 1988).
48. Id. at 5-6. See generally J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
525 (3d ed. 1986) [hereinafter J. NOWAK].
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Equal Protection

The second argument advanced against the banning of pit bull
dogs is that such a ban violates the equal-protection clauses of the fifth

and fourteenth amendments,49 which require that legislative classifications be proper ones. So long as no suspect classification or fundamental interest is involved-and ownership of pit bulls is not such a classification or interest 5 0-the

court need only find that there is a rational

relationship between the statute as drafted, and its ultimate purpose.5 1
Under this minimum-rationality test, "classifications are set aside as
violative of equal protection only if they are based solely on reasons
totally unrelated to pursuit of the state's goals and only if no grounds

can be conceived to justify them. 52 In other words, the minimum rationality standard requires the challenger to prove that the legislature.
acted in an arbitrary and irrational manner in passing the law. 53 Under
an equal-protection analysis, the question is not whether a ban on pit
bulls is rationally related to public safety, but whether discrimination

between owners of pit bulls and owners of other dogs bears such a rational relation.
1. Equal-Protection Challenges to Animal-Control Laws
Courts considering regulation of animals have consistently upheld
such laws against equal-protection challenges under a rational-relation

test, finding no suspect classification or fundamental right implicated.
Upheld regulations include bans on the ownership of lions, 5 ' pigs, 5

49. The equal-protection clause of the fourteenth amendment is quoted supra note 6. In
Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Glass Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911), the Supreme Court stated that
[t]he equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment does not take from the state the
power to classify in the adoption of police laws, but admits of the exercise of a wide scope
of discretion in that regard, and avoids what is done only when it is without any reasonable
basis and is therefore arbitrary.
Id. at 78; see also Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 495 (1974) ("[S]o long as the line drawn by
the State is rationally supportable, the courts will not interpose their judgment as to the appropriate stopping point."); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970) ("It is enough that the
State's action be rationally based and free from invidious discrimination."). See generally J.NoWAK, supra note 48, at 523-28.
50. See supra notes 11-20 and accompanying text.
51. Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 963 (1982); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Env't
Study Group, 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
The rational-relation test provides that "classifications are set aside as violative of equal protection only if they are based solely on reasons totally unrelated to pursuit of the state's goals and
only if no grounds can be conceived to justify them." Clements, 457 U.S. at 963; see also J.
NOWAK, supra note 48, at 530.
52. Clements, 457 U.S. at 963.
53. Duke Power Co., 438 U.S. at 82-83.
54. Kent v. Polk County Bd. of Supervisors, 391 N.W.2d 220 (Iowa 1986) (homeowner was
denied a permit to keep a pet lion) (discussed infra notes 59-62); City of Warren v. Testa, 461
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goats,56 ponies, 57 and bears."
For example, in Kent v. Polk County Board of Supervisors, 9 the
Iowa Supreme Court upheld a Polk City ordinance that prohibited individuals "from owning, sheltering, harboring, or keeping certain species of animals in Polk County, Iowa, with exceptions for those who
can qualify for a permit."6 0 The plaintiff claimed the ordinance violated the equal-protection clause because individuals who possessed a
lion for research or education could obtain a permit, while an individual who simply wished to keep a lion as a pet could not. Unpersuaded
by this argument, the court stated that "[b]ecause no fundamental
right or suspect class was involved in Kent's challenge, the proper level
of scrutiny is rational basis."6' 1 Thus, for Kent to prevail, the burden
was on him to show that no conceivable set of facts existed to justify
the legislative classification. In holding that "Kent failed to meet this
heavy burden," the court stated:
The ban on private ownership of "dangerous animals" is rationally related to the board's duty to promote the public safety and welfare. Moreover, the [County Board of Supervisor's] distinction between holding
these animals as pets and holding them for other purposes is rationally
related to the legitimate goal of public safety. The board could reasonably determine the benefit to society gained from limited exceptions for
research, education, and reproduction of endangered species outweighs
the threat to public safety. Similarly, the board could determine the
same societal benefit cannot be derived from individual pet ownership,
and therefore, such ownership does not outweigh the potential threat to
public safety. 2
In another case involving a pet lion, City of Warren v. Testa, 3 an
Ohio common pleas court found a city to be justified in prohibiting the
N.E.2d 1354 (Ohio C.P. 1983) (constitutional to prohibit the keeping of a lion in a city residence)
(discussed infra notes 63-69 and accompanying text).
55. Borough of Lincoln Park v. Cullari, 15 N.J. Super. 210, 83 A.2d 233 (1951) (ordinance
limiting the number of pigs that could be kept did not offend the equal-protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment) (discussed infra notes 72-75).
56. Town of Atlantic Beach v. Young, 307 N.C. 422, 298 S.E.2d 686 (1983) (defendant
was prohibited from keeping her two goats and one small pony, even though they were house
pets).
57. Wells v. Finley, 260 S.C. 291, 195 S.E.2d 623 (1973) (ordinance requiring owner to
remove ponies from his lot was not unconstitutional).
58. Cannady v. North Carolina Wildlife Resources Comm'n, 30 N.C. App. 247, 226 S.E.2d
678 (1976) (statute making it unlawful to own a black bear did not deny bear owner equal
protection).
59. 391 N.W.2d 220 (Iowa 1986).
60. Id. at 221.
61. Id. at 224-25.
62. Id. at 225.
63. 461 N.E.2d 1354 (Ohio C.P. 1983).
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keeping of a pet lion within city limits. Though the defendant was able
to produce witnesses who said they liked and admired the animal, and
one who even said he had hugged and played with the lion, the court
would not allow the owner to keep his pet. 6 ' The court reasoned that
city property, residential or otherwise, and particularly a residential
home . . is not a proper, safe, or legal place to own, keep, or harbor a
lion; that a lion, domesticated or not, is a potentially dangerous animal,
capable of doing harm, if loose, and even if attended; that a lion is capable of doing harm to its owner or handler. No one can guarantee or
predict the behavior of this animal, in the opinion of the Court; and I do
so find from the evidence.65
The defendant also claimed that the ordinance was unconstitutional because it "banished" rather that "regulated. "0"Rejecting that
argument, the court point out that
[a]lthough almost every exercise of the police power will necessarily either interfere with the enjoyment of liberty or the acquisition, possession
and production of property . . . an exercise of the police power having
such an effect will be valid if it bears a real and substantial relation to
the public health, safety, morals or general welfare of the public and if it
67
is not unreasonable or arbitrary.
The Testa court was persuaded that the city had the authority and
responsibility to prohibit keeping the lion under any circumstances, despite the hardship an outright ban would work on the defendant, who
consistently maintained that his pet was harmless and tame. Thus, although the defendant believed that his pet would never hurt him, the
court decided that the possibility of someone's being injured outweighed the defendant's right to keep the animal."
The keeping of pit bull dogs should be viewed as analogous to the
keeping of wild animals such as lions69 and bears, 70 and the state's
power to regulate pit bulls should be similarly expansive. Not unlike
the lion, the pit bull is an unpredictable and "potentially dangerous
animal, capable of doing harm, if loose, and even if attended. . . capable of doing harm to its owner or handler.'

64. Id. at 1357-58.
65. Id. at 1358.
66. Id. at 1360.
67. Id. (citing Benjamin v. City of Columbus, 167 Ohio St. 103, 146 N.E.2d 854 (1957)).
68. Id. at 1361.
69. Id. at 1357-61.
70. See Cannady v. North Carolina Wildlife Resources Comm'n, 30 N.C. App. 247, 226
S.E.2d 678 (1976).
71. Compare Testa, 461 N.E.2d at 358 (describing lions) with supra notes 20-48 and accompanying text (describing similar propensities in pit bulls).
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Not only violent animals like lions and pit bulls are subject to proscription on ownership. For example, in Borough of Lincoln Park v.
Cullari,"2 the defendant argued that an ordinance prohibiting a person
from keeping more than a certain number of pigs unconstitutionally
violated the equal-protection clause because the number selected was
an arbitrary one.7 3 A New Jersey appellate court disagreed, holding
that the ordinance did not offend equal protection because the limitation on the number of pigs was "reasonably calculated to achieve the
stated purpose."' 74 The court explained, "The right of private property
must yield to the common good, and when interfered with or restrained
offset by the
the assumed injury to the individual is presumed to be
75
benefit accruing to him as one of the public at large."
In a similar fashion, the rights of owners of pit bulls should yield
to the greater goal of protecting the public from vicious attacks.
2.

Banning the Pit Bull: Equal-Protection Arguments

Whether or not classifications of dog owners based upon ownership
of pit" bulls will stand up under constitutional attack depends upon
whether the classifications are reasonable. One way in which their reasonableness is examined is on the basis of "underinclusiveness" and
"overinclusiveness."
a. Underinclusiveness
Opponents assert that it is unconstitutional to treat differently the
owners of one breed of dogs when many kinds of dogs have injured
people. 76 This line of reasoning suggests that a ban on pit bulls should
be deemed unconstitutional because it is "underinclusive."
Underinclusive laws fail to fully accomplish the drafter's goals because not all potential subjects of the legislation are included in the
legislative category. 77 For example, pit-bull owners argue that other
kinds of dogs are just as likely to be involved in vicious attacks;7 8 thus,

72. 15 N.J. Super. 210, 83 A.2d 233 (1951).
73. Id. at 213, 83 A.2d at 234.
74. Id. at 214, 83 A.2d at 235.
75. Id. at 215, 83 A.2d at 235.
76. Pit Bull Owners Don't Like Being Singled Out, supra note 3.
77. Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949); see also J. NOWAK,
supra note 48, at 527. For the classic discussion of what is mean by "overinclusive" and "underinclusive," see Tussman & tenBrock, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REv. 341
(1949).
78. See Owners, Foes in Dogfight Over Pit Bulls, supra note 3, at 18-A, col. 3.
There are no reliable national statistics on non-fatal bites. However, a 1985 study in
Lucas County attributed 41 bites to a pit bull population of 421-a rate of 9.7 %. Comparable rates for other breeds were 4.5 % for Dobermans, 3.5% for German Shepherds, and
2.8% for St. Bernards.
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since the purpose of the law is to prevent vicious attacks, these other
dogs should be included in the ban as well.
A law does not fail to be constitutional, however, simply because it
is underinclusive. Such a law does not become any less rational because
other dogs could also be banned.7 " "It is no requirement of equal protection that all evils of the same genus be eradicated or none at all."8 0
The legislature may choose to address one phase of the problem at a
time.81 In 1986, an ordinance specifically regulating the keeping of pit
bulls survived an equal-protection challenge brought by pit-bull owners.
In Starkey v. Township of Chester,82 a United States district court
judge in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania found that a township
could reasonably determine that it was necessary to impose special restrictions on the keeping of pit bull dogs and held that it did "not have
to regulate every dangerous animal at the same time in the same way
83
to pass constitutional muster.1
Thus, although drafters of vicious-dog legislation hope to eliminate
the possibility of all severe attacks, their law would not fail because it
could not completely accomplish that objective. All that is required is
that some conceivable set of facts exists at the time of the law's enactment to justify the categorization of pit bulls as posing a threat to the
public. 84 With all the evidence of pit bulls, in particular, being involved
in severe and even fatal attacks, 85 it is evident that the classification
bears a rational relationship to the legitimate goal of protecting the
public.
b.

Overinclusiveness

Pit bull advocates also contend that a total ban on pit bulls would
be "overinclusive" in sense that the classification chosen encompasses
owners of more dogs than is necessary to accomplish the goal of protecting the public. 86 Some owners insist that their pit bulls are gentle
and loyal pets who would never harm anyone, and that it would be

Id.
79. Id. at 10 ("To satisfy equal protection tenets, it is not necessary that the Village address
all potential threats from all breeds of dog; instead, the Village was entitled to address a phase of
the problem that was of acute concern.").
80. Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 110 (1949).
81. Id.; see also Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955) (legislature may
take a "one-step-at-a-time" approach).
82. 628 F. Supp. 196 (E.D. Pa. 1986).
83. Id. at 197.
84. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961).
85. All five people killed by dogs from January 1, 1987, to August 17, 1987, were killed by
pit bulls or pit bull mixes. See Pit Bulls: Regulate Owners, Not Dogs, supra note 3.
86. Pit Bull Owners Don't Like Being Singled Out, supra note 3, at B3, col. 6.
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unfair to outlaw dogs that have never shown vicious tendencies.8 7 This
view ignores the evidence that pit bulls may suddenly turn on their
owners. 8 8 Even breeders concede that one cannot tell what a pit bull
might do because its hereditary strains cannot be perfectly
ascertained. 9
Although opponents of a total ban on pit bulls argue that it is
"unfair" to take someone's dog away before the dog has done anything
wrong, such a law is not inherently unconstitutional.90 Constitutionality
is not determined by a "fairness" standard. 91 Legislatures are- permitted to act to protect the public from the debilitating or possibly fatal 2
attacks by pit bulls, even if it means taking steps that sweep more
broadly than that which would be sufficient to accomplish this important goal." Arguably, some families own docile pit bulls who have
never threatened anybody; possibly their violent instincts have been effectively diluted over succeeding generations. 4 The undeniable fact remains, however, that a disproportionate number of pit bulls have been
involved in very serious attacks.95 Clearly, a ban on ownership of pit
bulls, whether underinclusive or overinclusive, bears a rational relation

87. Id.
88. See, e.g., Father of Mauled Boy Callsfor Ban of Pit Bulls, Kansas City Times, May 9,
1985, at B-I, col. 1 (reporting that on April 6, 1987, a sixteen-month old girl was killed by the
family's pet pit bull). Between 50 and 100 pit bulls were put to sleep by owners in Des Moines,
Iowa, in the first six months of 1987 because the owners feared that their pets might attack them.
Pit Bulls: Best Friendor Time Bomb?, supra note 3.
89. "[One former dog breeder says the killer instinct is in their blood. 'If you pick them up
when they're 3 days old, they'll growl at you. I've never known any other dogs to do that.'"
Watson, supra note 3, at 54. The Humane Society of the United States will not guarantee that
these animals make good pets, because "[tihe extent to which the original temperaments of these
breeds has been altered by breeding is often difficult to predict." R. LOCKWOOD & P. MILLER,
supra note 20, at 5.
90. Cf Testa, 461 N.E.2d at 1361 (city council can prohibit keeping of a dangerous animal
even though the representation can be made that the animal is harmless or tame).
91. See generally J. NOWAK, supra note 48, at 525-37.
92. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
93. The University of Cincinnati law review article, which maintains that breed-specific
laws are unconstitutional, does concede that an underinclusive law is not necessarily
unconstitutional:
The pit bull dog laws raise an additional equal protection question when the ordinances
define vicious dogs to include all pit bull dogs. These ordinances appear to be overly inclusive because, it may be argued, not all pit bull dogs are indeed vicious. This line of reasoning would be easily dismissed, however, by the general rationale of the seminal canine
control case, Sentell v. New Orleans & Carrollton R.R., 166 U.S. 698 (1897). In Sentell,
the Court acknowledged that canine control laws affect dogs that are "harmless" but stated
that the broad reach of the law was necessary to accomplish protection of public safety.
Thus, the argument that laws controlling pit bull dogs are unfair in their affect upon harmless members of the breed would appear to be easily refuted.
Comment, supra note 5, at 1077-78 n.67 (citations omitted).
94. But see supra note 89.
95. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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to the legitimate legislative goal of public safety.
C.

Vagueness

Opponents protest that a law banning pit bulls is unconstitutionally vague because it does not clearly indicate what is being banned.
They argue that the term "pit bull" is imprecise and includes a wide
variety of dogs.9 6 To overcome a vagueness challenge, the state must

show that the law clearly notifies an ordinary individual that an activity
is prohibited.97 Using reference manuals and expert witnesses, courts

have generally upheld such laws against vagueness challenges. Since a
law banning pit bulls does not inhibit the exercise of any constitutionally-protected right, the more-stringent vagueness test applicable to
"fundamental rights" situations is inapplicable and such laws are
judged under a rational-relation standard. 8
In City of Lima v. McFadden,9 an Ohio appellate court stated
that an ordinance banning pit bulls was neither vague nor indefinite,

but rather, "pertain[ed] to a particular breed of dog with characteristics generally conforming to the characteristics set forth in . . . [spe-

cific] references." 100 The court explained that "[w]hether any particular animal falls within this classification is an issue of fact to be

determined by the evidence presented."10 1 Similarly, in Garcia v. Village of Tijeras, °2 the New Mexico Court of Appeals court also upheld

a ban on pit bulls against a void-for-vagueness challenge, finding that

the "breed [could be] recognized by its physical characteristics. ' 1
In a paper presented at the October 1986 annual meeting of the

Washington State Association of Municipal Attorneys,104 Michael E.
96. The term "pit bull" is a generic term for a group of dogs whose ancestry can be traced
to the bulldogs of the 19th century. The United Kennel Club and the American Dog Breeders
Association refer to this kind of dog as the American Pit Bull Terrier, while the American Kennel
Club knows it as the American Staffordshire Terrier. "Pit bull" also includes mixtures of these
dogs with one another and with the Staffordshire Bull Terrier, the Bull Terrier, and the bulldog.
See R. LOCKWOOD & P. MILLER, supra note 20, at 1.
97. Grayned v. City of Rockfcrd, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972) (enunciated standards for
evaluating vagueness).
98. Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 499
(1982).
99. No. 1-85-22 (Ohio Ct. App., Allen County June 30, 1986) (LEXIS, States library, Ohio
file).
100. Id. at 5 (citing WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1981); W.
BRUETTE & K. DONNELLY, COMPLETE DOG BUYER'S GUIDE (1983); AMERICAN KENNEL CLUB,
THE COMPLETE DOG BOOK 377 (15th ed. 1977); W. FLETCHER, DOGS OF THE WORLD 99 (1983)).
101. Id.
102. No. 9424 (N.M. Ct. App. Oct. 11, 1988).
103. Id. at 4.
104. M. Weight, City Bites Dog: Regulating Vicious Dogs/Pit Bull Terriers (Oct. 1986)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the University of Dayton Law Review).
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Weight, Assistant City Attorney for the City of Everett, Washington,
explained how the vagueness challenge can be overcome:
The average person can identify a collie or German shepherd. For
those persons who have had contact with pit bulls, their identification is
equally as simple. A definition of the breed that anticipates visual identification of those dogs we know as the American Pit Bull Terrier, the
American Staffordshire Terrier and the Staffordshire Bull Terrier gives
sufficient notice to the average person." 5
One court has struck down a pit-bull law on vagueness grounds. In
Holder v. City of Hollywood, 0 ' a Florida trial court found such a law
unconstitutionally vague because owners had no way of knowing
whether their dog was addressed by the statute. 10 7 The "Everett Ordinance,"' 0 8 advocated by Mr. Weight, attempts to overcome such a deficiency by placing the burden of proof as to notice on the prosecution. 10 9
The dog owner must know that his or her dog is a pit bull to be found
guilty of violating the ordinance." 0 The prosecution is able to prove
such knowledge because the city has instituted a formal procedure to
give notice to pit bull owners."' As long as means of identifying pit
bulls are made available to citizens, laws banning these dogs should not
be found to be unconstitutionally vague.
The mere fact that determining whether a dog is a pit bull requires factual analysis does not mean that a law banning pit bulls is
unconstitutionally vague." 2 "The degree of vagueness that the Constitution tolerates-as well as the relative importance of fair notice and
fair enforcement-depends in part on the nature of the enactment.""'
Thus, it is imperative that a statute banning pit bulls sufficiently describe the breed, so that citizens know what is being prohibited." 4
Trained investigators, who can determine by sight whether or not a

105. Id. at 12.
106. No. 81-13968-CR (Fla. Cir. Ct., Broward County Nov. 9, 1982) (cited in Comment,
supra note 5, at 1079).
107. Comment, supra note 5, at 1079.
108. EVERETT, WASH., MUNICIPAL CODE § 6.08 (Dec. 1986).
109. M. Weight, supra note 104, at 12.
110. EVERETT, WASH., MUNICIPAL CODE § 6.08 (Dec. 1986).
111. M. Weight, supra note 104, at 7-8; see also infra notes 123-28 (discussing similar
proposal made by Mayor Edward I. Koch of New York City).
112. United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 618 (1954) ("[I]f the general class of offenses
to which a statute is directed is plainly within its terms, the statute will not be struck down as
vague, even though marginal cases could be put where doubts might arise.").
113. Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498
(1982).
114. Cf Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971) (law not unconstitutionally
vague if an ordinary person can understand what is being prohibited).
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given dog is a pit bull, 115 should be consulted in drafting definition sections and enforcing bans. If a legislature or town council, with the help
of capable advisors, enacts legislation banning pit bulls, courts should
be willing to give a reasonable construction to such statutes so that the
laws are not found to be unconstitutionally vague. 1 6
Even more importantly, a person who acknowledges owning a pit
bull cannot attack a breed-specific statute for vagueness at all. "A
plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot
complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of
others.""1 7 quoted at gar 5 Thus, a statute providing for notice before
seizure or other penalty should eliminate most complaints that the law
should not be enforced because of vagueness.
III. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Two recent developments indicate growing support for upholding
breed-specific bans. In New Mexico, a municipal pit-bull ban challenged on virtually every conceivable due-process and equal-protection
basis was upheld; across the country, in New York City, Mayor Edward I. Koch proposed a tough, yet constitutionally-sensitivepit-bull
ban.
In Garcia v. Village of Tijeras,"s the New Mexico Court of Appeals affirmed the district court judge's decision upholding a municipal
pit-bull ban against due process, equal protection, and vagueness challenges. 119 Adopted after a tragic accident in which a pit bull attacked
and severely injured a young child, the Tijeras ordinance specifically
provides:
It is unlawful to own or possess in the Village any dog of the breed
known as American Pit Bull Terrier. Any such dog may be impounded
by the Mayor or Animal Control Officer to be destroyed as provided
herein. It shall be held until a determination is made by a court of competent jurisdiction that the animal is an American Pit Bull Terrier and
shall accordingly order that the dog be destroyed.' 2
115. The Humane Society of the United States indicates that "[e]xperienced investigators
can often successfully determine the state of origin of a particular bloodline on the basis of the
dogs' overall appearance." R. LOCKWOOD & P. MILLER, supra note 20, at 5.
116. United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 618 (1954) (quoted supra note 112).
117. Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 495
(1982).
118. No. 9424 (N.M. Ct. App. Oct. 11, 1988).
Numerous legislatures and jurisdictions have requested copies of the Tijeras ordinance banning pit bulls. The Tijeras Village Clerk presently receives two or three requests every day. Telephone interview with Teresa Jaramillo, Tijeras, N.M., Village Clerk, August 17, 1987.
119. See, e.g., Garcia, No. 9424, slip op. at 3, 5, 9-10, 12.
120. Tijeras, N.M., Ordinance 32 (May 14, 1984), upheld, Garcia v. Village of Tijeras, No.
CV 84-04162 (N.M. Dist. Ct., Bernalillo County May 29, 1985), affd, No. 9424 (N.M. Ct. App.
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The New Mexico Court of Appeals, in a persuasive and well-reasoned opinion, highlighted carefully the presumptions of constitutionality that favor the drafter under a rational-relation analysis. 1 2' More
significantly, determining that the pit bull has an identifiable "phenotype," or "typical physical appearance," the court held that owners of
dogs either admitted to be pit bulls or recognized by the court as such
have unquestionably violated the statute-and thus have no claim of
vagueness. 2 2
Also illuminating is New York City Mayor Koch's 1987 proposal
of "local legislation requiring the registration of pit bulls already
owned and a ban on the possession or sale of any pit bulls in the
city."' 23 The Mayor declared that, under the proposed law, the Department of Health would assist owners in determining whether their dogs
are pit bulls. 24 The legislation would provides that
"[a]ny owner violating the provisions of the law will be subject to a civil
penalty of not more than $500 per violation for each day that any violations continue. Anybody who knowingly violates the law will be guilty of
a misdemeanor and subject to a fine of not more than $5,000 or impris'
onment for one year, or both." 125
This proposal should overcome the constitutional challenges discussed in this article. The proposal provides a workable method for a
citizen to determine whether or not his or her animal falls within the
proscribed category, so that he or she knows what is being prohibited;
thus, the law is not unconstitutionally vague. 2 Furthermore, the proposal distinguishes between a civil penalty and a criminal sentence, so
that if a citizen is unaware that his or her dog is a pit bull, he or she is
only civilly liable.'2 7 This is important, as the constitutional test for
vagueness is less stringent when a civil rather than a criminal law is
8
involved.'

Oct. 11, 1988).
121. E.g.. Garcia, No. 9424, slip op. at 2-3, 10.
122. Id. at 5.
123. Office of the Mayor, N.Y. City, Press Release No. 277 (Aug. 17, 1987) [hereinafter
Press Release] (on file with the University of Dayton Law Review).
124. Id. at 2.
125. Id. at 3.
126. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972). For an example of an ordinance
that provides notice of ownership of the type of dog prohibited by the law, see EVERETT, WASH.,
MUNICIPAL CODE

127.
128.
(1982).

§ 6.08 (Dec. 1986).

Press Release, supra note 123, at 3.
Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498-99
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CONCLUSION

States and municipalities must better appreciate the full breadth
of the police power in situations involving the regulation of dangerous
animals. Carefully-drafted laws that clearly define the type of animal
being prohibited can survive constitutional challenges. Furthermore, a
statute can sufficiently describe the term "pit bull" to defeat a void-forvagueness challenge. Moreover, so long as a community can show that
the ban on pit bulls bears a rational relationship to the safety of its
citizens, the law will survive an equal-protection challenge as well.
Even legislators who, for some reason, do not support a ban on
ownership of pit bulls must ensure that licensing and regulating statutes are strict enough to provide for the prohibition of any dog that
poses a serious threat to the public. 9 Lawmakers and law enforcement
officials have a duty to see that people need no longer live in fear of
"man's best friend."1 30
Sallyanne K. Sullivan

129.
note 4).
130.

See R.I.

GEN. LAWS

§ 4-13.1-1 (Supp. 1986) (governing vicious dogs) (discussed supra

Watson, supra note 3, at 54-55.
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